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Abstract—The cloud computing has recently emerged as 
compelling paradigm for managing and delivery services over 
the internet. However, users as well as critical infrastructure 
operators, have legitimate concerns about  the  conﬁdential- 
ity, integrity and availability, in short the dependability, of 
applications and their data hosted on a  third-party  cloud. 
The dependability is become a commercial imperative for 
cloud providers, especially to support cloud computing for 
critical infrastructures. In this paper the SecureCloud project, 
its approach and goals are presented. SecureCloud aims to 
remove technical impediments to dependable cloud computing, 
encouraging and enabling a greater uptake of cost-effective, 
environment-friendly, and innovative cloud solutions, in par- 
ticular, for critical infrastructure applications. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability of  applications 
and their data  are  requirements  that  immediately  concern 
to almost all organizations that use cloud computing. This 
is particularly true for organizations that must comply with 
strict conﬁdentiality, availability and integrity policies, in- 
cluding those society’s most Critical Infrastructures, such as 
ﬁnance, utilities, health care and smart grids. Dependability 
(which implies conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability) has 
emerged as a  commercial  imperative  for  cloud  providers 
to be able to support emerging markets as well as cloud 
computing for critical infrastructures or cloud  robotics. 
The cloud has not only become a critical  infrastructure 
itself but it needs to support other critical infrastructures. 
These include smart grids and systems in the health and 
transportation domains but also extend to future large-scale 
computing, such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber- 
Physical Systems (CPS). The lack of sufﬁcient dependabil- 
ity, however, is increasingly becoming the primary barrier 
to the broad adoption of cloud computing, not only in the 
critical infrastructure domain but also in all domains in 
which the survival of a company depends on the reliability 
of the cloud. Hence, the cloud becomes itself a critical 
infrastructure for which we need to guarantee adequate 
dependability such that  we  can  justiﬁably  place  our  trust 
in the hosted applications. The Cloud Industry Forum (CIF) 
[?] reports that data security and privacy - which are two 
important factors of dependability - are the top two concerns 
preventing the adoption of cloud computing in the United 
Kingdom. More in general, in Europe, the Steering Board 
of the European Cloud Partnership (ECP) identiﬁes data 
protection and information security concerns as “the most 
ubiquitous requirements” for developing a trusted European 
cloud infrastructure [?]. In this context, the EU H2020 Se- 
cureCloud project (Secure Big Data Processing in Untrusted 
Cloud) proposes a innovative approach to ensure the depend- 
ability of critical applications that are executed in distributed, 
potentially untrusted cloud infrastructures. This innovative 
approach leverages the emergence of a new and promising 
technology – secure  commodity  CPUs  –  which  promises 
to enable a new generation of dependable applications by 
basing trust in hardware mechanisms offered by commodity 
CPUs, in particular, Intel’s Secure Guard eXtensions (SGX) 
[?]. This permits applications to be isolated not only from 
other applications in the cloud, but also from the underlying 
operating system and the hypervisor. It allows users to run 
their sensitive applications in a public cloud  without  the 
need to unconditionally trust the cloud provider. Moreover, 
to facilitatethe usage applications with high or very high 
security requirements, SecureCloud will integrate and ex- 
tend the most popular technologies (i.e OpenStack, Secure 
Container, Coordination Service and Software-Deﬁned Net- 
works(SDN)) of last years to ensure the dependability of 
cloud applications. The paper is organised as follow: Section 
2 provides a project overview, the proposed approach and 
its goals. In Section 3 the fundamentals of SGX technology 
is discussed. A real use case and an attack scenario through 
which will demonstrate the potentiality of SecureCloud 
approach are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper with ﬁnal remarks. 
 
II. SECURECLOUD OVERVIEW 
SecureCloud project focuses on a particularly important 
domain: applications that support critical infrastructures. If 
one can trust a cloud to run applications in the context of 
critical infrastructures, one can clearly  trust  this  cloud  to 
run applications in a large variety of application domains. 
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The area of interest of the project is the smart grids 
domain. Smart grid applications offer the opportunities to 
consider many of the requirements that a sensitive big data 
applications may have when executing in the cloud. First, 
smart grid applications deal with a growing volume of data. 
Smart meters and sensors for monitoring distribution and 
transmission grids are being deployed and are capable of 
continuously collecting and transmitting data. Adequate use 
of this data enables energy distributors not only to optimise 
their infrastructure, but also to reduce the environmental 
impact of supplying power to a given load or region. Second, 
these promising data analysis require to have access to 
detailed information about energy consumption. This data 
represents a big privacy risk because it can be used to ac- 
curately proﬁle consumers activities and behaviors. Finally, 
when applications consider the data and decide to react to it, 
this reaction would interfere with the physical world. If an 
adversary compromises such actuating applications, the ac- 
tuation could have devastating effects on the power system. 
In stark contrast to traditional throughput-oriented, batch- 
processing cloud applications, applications in the critical 
infrastructure domain do not only have strong requirements 
with respect to conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability,  but 
they typically are also latency sensitive. Secure storage of 
sensitive data in untrusted clouds is widely regarded as a 
solved problem [?] [?]. However, the secure and efﬁcient 
processing of sensitive data in untrusted cloud is an open 
issue for securing cloud computing. 
SecureCloud approach leverages and extends the following 
technologies: 
 
• Intel SGX as root of application trust to provide 
conﬁdentiality and integrity of sensitive data. SGX 
isolates the memory content of protected applications 
to prevent the operating system or the hypervisor from 
being able to read and/or modify application data. 
• OpenStack as a common cloud stack infrastructure. 
• Container technology to allow the execution of Intel 
SGX secure enclaves inside containers. 
• Coordination Service to detect a computer or an appli- 
cation process failure and restart either the application 
process on a different computer or a newly created 
virtual machine, or the container depending on the 
requirements of the application process. 
• Software-Deﬁned Networks(SDN) to connect the ap- 
plication components within data centres as well as 
across data centres. 
 
 
III. INTEL SGX TECHNOLOGY: BASIC CONCEPTS 
The SecureCloud platform enables secure processing 
and the dependability of on-cloud critical  applications  
exploit- ing the Intel’s Secure Guard eXtensions (SGX) as 
key technology. SGX aims at solving the so called 
“secure remote computation” problem. This problem  
deals  with the execution of applications on a remote 
host owned and maintained by an untrusted party. The 
solution proposed by Intel leverages trusted hardware (i.e. 
the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)) in the remote 
computer. The SGX extensions are introduced with the 6th 
generation Intel core processors “Skylake” to protect 
selected code, data and sensitive processing from disclosure 
and modiﬁcation. These extensions allow programs to 
allocate protected regions of execution in memory, known 
as secure enclaves,  isolating application’s  secrets  from  
external  world  and  privileged 
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Figure 1.   SecureCloud architecture 
 
 
software, such as kernel and hypervisor. The access to the 
secure enclaves is regulated by security mechanisms en- 
forced by the CPU. The information stored within an enclave 
(sensitive data and the code that processes it) are protected 
by the SGX that identiﬁes and enables the applications that 
can execute it. Only trusted applications can access to the 
enclave, without having to trust the environment that hosted 
them. To do this, the SGX supports the software attestation 
feature which proves the reliability of a chunk of code 
running in an enclave. The attestation process convinces an 
enclave that it is communicating with another enclave that 
it is running in a secure container  and  also,  that  has  not 
been altered. This mutual veriﬁcation between the enclaves 
is enforced using processor  key  which  is  accessible  only 
by a speciﬁc enclaves, called “Quoting Enclave”.  Given 
that, two applications could reside in the same or different 
machine and SGX supports both an intra-attestation and an 
inter-attestation procedure. The inter-attestation provides a 
secure channel between two remote enclaves by using a key 
exchange protocol,  which  the  Difﬁe-Hellman  protocol  [?] 
is an example. Of course,  the  high  security  provided  by 
the SGX technology has a cost both in performance (the 
veriﬁcation of reliable enclaves has a non-negligible impact 
on the performance) and for the restricted set of operations 
that an application can do in an enclave (the system calls 
are  not  allowed).  These  limitations  must  be  addressed  by 
a careful design of the SGX-enabled applications, choosing 
appropriately what can be stored within the enclave and what 
can be outside of them. 
IV. SMART HOMES APPLICATION USE CASE 
As mentioned in Section ??, in order to validate and 
demonstrate the need and the feasibility of using secure 
clouds, the SecureCloud project considers  use  cases  in 
the area of smart grids. Smart grid applications offer the 
opportunities to  consider many of the  requirements that a 
sensitive big data applications may have when executing in 
the cloud. One of these use cases involves the collection of 
power consumption data from a residential user. The cloudi- 
ﬁcation of smart home applications is a promising solution in 
terms of beneﬁts for the society. However, migrating house 
energy management information to the cloud poses stringent 
security requirements to applications. Once this data is 
under control of an energy provider, an adversary could 
compromise this data, or a malicious employee could gain 
access to them. Data loss, data breach, data corruption, and 
Denial of Service (DoS) are the main risks to be considered 
if sensitive data are moved to a cloud-based infrastructure. 
Therefore, the data gathered from the on ﬁeld sensors, 
especially  their  conﬁdentiality,  has  to  be  protected.  Also, 
a secure data storage and a reliable communication between 
smart meters and applications is necessary. Given the above 
requirements, is been deﬁned the design of a Smart Homes 
application composed by several micro-services. Figure ?? 
shows the Smart Homes application micro-services and their 
integration with SecureCloud platform. In the following, an 
exhaustive list of the micro-services concerning the Smart 
Homes application is reported: 
• Data Collector is the micro-service responsible for 
acquiring and forwarding data retrieved by the sensors 
toward other application micro-services. 
• Alarm Manager is the micro-service responsible  to 
spot alarms or critical conditions. 
• SQL Archive to store historical data into a SQL 
database. 
• Access Controller is the micro-service that performs 
the Identity Access Management (IAM) of the applica- 
tion users. 
• Web Proxy is the micro-service that provides data 
coming from the  Smart  Homes  application  back-end 
to the front-end dashboard. 
• Dashboard GUI is a web-based Human Machine Inter- 
face (HMI) for analysing historical data and detecting 
possible anomalous patterns.  The GUI  must establish 
a secure channel with the Web Proxy micro-service in 
order to protect the visualisation of the measurements. 
Each micro-service will be executed in a distinct secure 
container and a secure event bus (i.e. ZeroMQ [?]) is been 
selected  to  guarantee  a  secure  message  exchange  between 
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Figure 2.   Smart Homes application micro-services 
 
 
the  micro-services. 
 
A.  Attack scenario 
 
An application for acquiring, processing and storing data 
coming from a smart home  represents  an  interesting  tar- 
get for a cyberattack. The interest dramatically increases 
when these applications use cloud-based infrastructure. This 
means that sensitive data, as well as  its  processing,  is  at 
risk. Therefore, the Smart Homes application use case will 
demonstrate how the SecureCloud approach mitigates this 
risk. Two fundamental security mechanisms will be shown. 
On one hand, the data acquired from the smart home sensors 
will be analysed in order to detect anomalous activities. The 
detection of an anomalous situation can be an indicator of a 
cyber or a real world attack. On the other hand, the system 
which executes this anomaly detection has to be secure itself. 
In  order  to  show  how  the  system  can  be  implemented  in 
a secure way the scenario focuses on a speciﬁc type  of 
attack, named Iago attack [?]. The Iago attack consists in 
the mounting of a malicious kernel on the node where the 
target application runs. The malicious kernel runs at higher 
privileges on the processor, and can perform a cyberattack 
on the target application by reading application secrets from 
the memory or manipulating data. A malicious user can 
execute a Iago attack against the cloud machine where the 
anomaly detection application runs violating  the  integrity 
and conﬁdentiality of data processed and stored in that 
machine. Security measures against Iago attacks have been 
investigated and presented  in [?], where  a paraveriﬁcation 
technique that enforces the untrusted operating system to 
participate in its own veriﬁcation is proposed.  A different 
approach has been presented in [?], where a user-provided 
token returned by the operating system  allows  to  verify 
that newly memory mapped regions do not overlap the old 
ones. The proposed attack scenario  will  demonstrate  how 
the enhanced security technologies implemented in the Se- 
cureCloud platform thwart this type of threat. In particular, 
the SecureCloud SGX-enabled architecture will protect the 
memory contents stored in the enclaves from the malicious 
operating system and the use of ZeroMQ as event bus, 
combined with its security protocol, will prevent message 
breach during the communication among the enclaves. 
V. CONCLUSION 
SecureCloud will clearly make one step forward in the 
dependability of critical applications executed in potentially 
untrusted cloud infrastructures. To reach this meaningful 
goal, the SecureCloud approach combines secure CPU hard- 
ware in commodity processors and a trusted computing 
base. The integration of SecureCloud platform features into 
a standard cloud stack will encourage easy migration of 
critical, as well as non-critical applications, to the cloud 
without compromising application dependability. As a result, 
this project will contribute for inﬂuencing the standards and 
best practices to remove the barrier to the broad adoption of 
cloud computing in the critical infrastructure domain. The 
ease of adoption, in combination with the cost fairness of 
the cloud model, will enable enterprises or individual users, 
to create and deploy secure data-processing applications in 
the cloud. 
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